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Abstract. The theories of project management are not well developed despite the exist-
ence of extensive literature on the topic. This paper derives a New Institutional Econom-
ic theory of project management. It is suggested that project management encompasses 
both the discipline of operational management and that of economics. The operational 
management part deals with optimization of project processes. The basic postulation of 
the economic part is that human beings will maximize their benefits under constraints. 
Constraints are converted to either price or cost to facilitate the application of the law of 
demand. Three examples are used to demonstrate how refutable hypotheses can be de-
rived when changes in constraints lead to changes in behaviours. The functions of project 
management are discussed in the contexts of this theoretical framework. A synthesis with 
existing theories is also given.  
Keywords: new institutional economics, project management theory, constraints, con-
struction, economics, operational management. 
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Introduction
This paper develops a New Institutional Economic theory of project management. The 
motivation comes from the confusing opinions on the theory.
On the one hand, there are claims that there is no coherent underlying theory of project 
management (Shenhar, Dvir 1996) and that the theory is implicit and obsolete (Koskela, 
Howell 2002). Indeed, Kloppenborg and Opfer (2002) had nothing to report on theory 
in their analysis of 3,554 research works on project management, spanning 40 years. 
The claim that there is no theory of project management annoyed J. Rodney Turner, 
who then attempted to develop a theory through a serious of editorials in International 
Journal of Project Management (IJPM) (2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d). 
On the other hand, there are extensive literature on project management, there are even 
journals dedicated to project management (e.g. IJPM and Project Management Journal), 
and there are numerous schools of thoughts or perspectives of project management. For 
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instance, Bredillet, again in a serious of editorials of IJPM (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2008a, 
2008b, 2008c), suggested nine schools of thoughts. 
There are also arguments that there should not be just a theory, but some theories of 
project management, e.g. Morris (2002), and that different types of projects need dif-
ferent theories (Shenhar 2001). This has led to the research on the project typology 
(Lalonde et al. 2010; Shenhar, Dvir 1996).
As a result, a number of authors, e.g., Söderlund (2004), have called for more theoretical 
formations in the field of project management. Inspired by the fruitful developments of 
New Institutional Economics since 1960s, this paper attempts to make a contribution 
to the theory of project management from the New Institutional Economic perspective.
1. Project management theories: a brief review
There exist two main theoretical traditions in project management research, namely, the 
Task Perspective and the Organizational Perspective. The Task Perspective of project 
management is also known as “hard” perspective, while the Organizational Perspective 
is generally known as “soft” perspective, although the terms “hard” and “soft” have 
been used in a loose and ambiguous way (Crawford, Pollack 2004).
1.1. Task perspective of project management
The task perspective of project management theory focused on the planning and control 
mechanisms in project. It has its intellectual roots in the engineering science and ap-
plied mathematics. During the 1950s, network analysis and planning techniques, such 
as program evaluation and review technique (PERT) and critical path methods (CPM) 
formed the focus of development in project management (Crawford et al. 2006b). Later 
on, the increasing use of computers has given rise to a “second generation” of opera-
tions research devoted to computer applications and expert systems for project planning, 
control and risk analysis (Packendorff 1995).
Essentially, the task perspective of project management theory generally divides a pro-
ject into 3 distinct stages, namely, development, implementation and termination (Pinto, 
Prescott 1990). The development phase is usually subdivided into conceptualization and 
planning stages (Packendorff 1995). These phases are always assumed to be sequential, 
and therefore the Task Perspective of project management theory can be described in 
terms of a theory of planning, a theory of execution and a theory of evaluation (Koskela, 
Howell 2002; Packendorff 1995).
The theory of planning assumes that works are clearly defined can be divided into a 
number of processes through, e.g. a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) (Packendorff 
1995). The theory assumes a causal relationship between action of management (plan-
ning) and the outcome (Koskela, Howell 2002). The theory of execution is similar to 
job dispatching in manufacturing (Koskela, Howell 2002). It basically involves setting 
up a project organization and dispatch or allocates the tasks. The theory of evaluation 
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involves performance reporting and the lessons learned will be used to the correct the 
previous phases (planning or execution) (Koskela, Howell 2002).
This traditional task perspective of project management theory has been critiqued by 
several authors (Koskela, Howell 2002; Maylor 2001; Morris et al. 2000; Packendorff 
1995). The major reason is that accepting and applying such orthodoxy does not elimi-
nate project failures, nor does it guarantee project success (Williams 2004). Therefore, 
this approach to project management is increasingly being recognized as not being the 
full view, and not always even the appropriate view of the discipline (Morris 2002). As 
a result, alternative views were proposed to which we turn.
1.2. Organizational perspective of project management
The Organizational Perspective of project management has its intellectual roots in social 
science. Traces of organizational perspective of project management, including project 
organization structures, leadership and the role of human resource management, ap-
peared in the 1960s and 1970s (Cicmil, Hodgson 2006; Packendorff 1995). The 1980s 
were typified by a focus on project organization, project risk, project front end, external 
influences, among others (Crawford et al. 2006b). While in the 1990s, project manage-
ment has become a “multidisciplinary subject” (Winch 1996). This trend continued in 
2000s, and we saw a growth in the amount of project work across different – if not 
most – industries (Hanisch, Wald 2011). 
In essence, the organizational perspective looks into the process, governance, behav-
ioural, cultural and political aspects in the project. The underlying assumption is that 
these aspects will affect project performance. There is, however, no consolidated or 
widely agreed theory on the organization perspective of project management.
Bredillet, with his colleagues Turner and Anbari, organized the literature on project 
management into nine schools of thoughts, namely, the optimization school, the mod-
eling school, the governance school, the behaviour school, the success school, the de-
cision school, the process school, the contingency school, and the marketing school 
(Bredillet 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). The optimization school and 
arguably the success school are based on the task perspective. The modeling school 
encompasses both the task perspective and the organizational perspective. However, 
most other schools of thoughts, including the governance school, the behaviour school, 
the decision school, the process school, and the marketing school could be allocated to 
the organizational perspective. 
Despite the abounding research works on the organizational perspective, there is no 
consolidated theory on it. Attempts have been made to apply economic theories into 
the study of governance and behaviours of people in project management. Notable ex-
amples include the application of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Turner, Keegan 
2001; Turner, Simister 2001; Winch 1989), Principal-Agent Theory (PA Theory) 
(Mahaney, Lederer 2010; Müller, Turner 2005; Turner, Müller 2003) as well as the 
corollary of Coase Theorem (Lai et al. 2008; Yung 2009; Yung, Lai 2008).
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A notable development in this perspective is the concept of projects as temporary or-
ganizations (Lundin, Söderholm 1995; Packendorff 1995; Pollack 2007; Turner, Müller 
2003; Turner, Simister 2001). This concept was first propounded in Sweden, therefore 
it is sometimes known as “Scandinavian School” of project studies. In this school, a 
project is seen as a temporary organization, and action, instead of decision, is at the 
center of the theory (Lundin, Söderholm 1995). Based on this school of thought, Turner 
has attempted to develop a theory in a series of editorials, in which the nature of pro-
ject, its governance of the functions of project management were discussed (Turner 
2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d). Unfortunately, instead of further developing the “action-
based” theoretical framework, later development in this school involves the application 
of Transaction Cost Economics (Turner, Keegan 2001; Turner, Simister 2001).
1.3. Other perspective of project management
Contingency Theories have been applied to both permanent and temporary organiza-
tions (Harnisch, Wald 2012). For instance, Shenhar (2001) insisted that different types 
of projects need different theories. This has led to the research on the project typology 
(Lalonde et al. 2010; Shenhar, Dvir 1996) and on the matching of management ap-
proach and leadership styles with project types (Crawford et al. 2006a; Müller, Turner 
2007). Believing in this contingency theory of project management, Morris (2002) ar-
gued that the scope of project management is too broad to have a single theory. 
In addition, the research on project management has been criticized as being not suf-
ficiently empirical (Packendorff 1995). Some authors therefore advocated to research 
on what project managers actually do, proposing a “project-as-practice” approach 
(Blomquist et al. 2010; Cicmil et al. 2006). 
1.4. The way forward
To summarize, although there are abundant research works on project management, the 
theories of project management could be generally categorized into a task perspective 
and an organizational perspective, and the theories have been underdeveloped and need 
more contributions. Therefore, a number of authors have called for more theoretical 
formations in the field of project management. 
For instance, Söderlund (2004) stressed the need to develop various theories of projects 
in a similar tradition as has been within the broader field of management research. 
An UK research network called “Rethinking Project Management: Developing a New 
Research Agenda” suggested that “a new research network was needed to enrich and 
extend the field beyond its current intellectual foundations, and connect it more closely 
to the challenges of contemporary project management practice” (Winter et al. 2006). 
The directions proposed in this study indicated the trend towards more theory-based 
research. 
Packendorff (1995) argued that projects are institutions and the application of New 
Institutional organizational theory in the study of projects is “an interesting research 
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field for future exploration”. This paper attempts to make a contribution to the theory 
of project management. 
2. NIE theory of project management
This paper seeks to develop a New Institutional Economic framework of project man-
agement which can derive refutable hypotheses for empirical testing. It is, however, 
necessary to introduce some basic concepts first.
2.1. Economics vs. engineering
Economics as a science asks and answers the question “why”. It is used to explain phe-
nomenon, notably human behaviour, while engineering deals with “how”. Does project 
management fall into economics or engineering?
The major job of the project manager is to make sure the project commence and 
complete within budget, on time and to specification. Therefore, project management 
inevitably involves optimization of project processes, which falls into industrial engi-
neering or operation management. However, economic theories are essential as project 
management inevitably involve human decisions and behaviours. Therefore, we sug-
gest that project management is a discipline that shall encompass both economics and 
engineering. 
2.2. Constraints
Adam Smith argued that the selfishness of human beings leads to the functioning of eco-
nomic system. The selfishness has been interpreted as “constrained maximization” since 
neo-classical economics. Constrained maximization postulates that human beings will 
maximize their benefits under the constraints. It has become a basic postulation of neo-
classical economics. New Institutional Economics does not confront with neo-classical 
economics. It merely introduces some constraints that were ignored in the latter. 
There are as many types of constraints as one may imagine. However, following 
Steven Cheung (2002a), constraints can be broadly divided into eight categories, namely, 
wealth, price, knowledge, cost, law of diminishing marginal productivity, competition, 
property rights, and transaction costs. We shall add two further categories, namely, risk 
and time.
The first two constraints, i.e., wealth and price, are related to consumption. We follow 
Irving Fisher’s definitions of wealth. Everything that can generate income is capital as-
set. Wealth is the discounted present value of all incomes. Price is the exchange value of 
a good. In equilibrium, it will equal to the maximum marginal use value of a consumer.
The following three, i.e., knowledge, cost, and the law of diminishing marginal pro-
ductivity, are related to production. Knowledge refers to the theoretical or practical 
understanding of a subject. Cost is the highest-valued opportunity necessarily forsaken. 
The law of diminishing marginal productivity says if there are two factors of production, 
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e.g. land and labour, one increases and the other remains constant, the total products 
will increase but the rate of increase will diminish.
The last three, i.e., competition, property rights and transaction costs only appear in a 
society. The latter two were introduced in New Institutional Economics. Competition 
happens because economic goods are scarce and demanded by more than one people. 
Property rights are rules of the game. As people compete, there must be rules to deter-
mine who wins. The rules include the legal system that helps establish and maintain the 
rules. The rules may be price (if you can pay, you get the goods), ranks in the society 
(as in communist China), etc.
Transaction costs refer to the costs of negotiating and enforcing the stipulations of the 
contract (Cheung 1969; North 2000). North (2000) added that the cost of transacting is 
the cost of specifying and measuring the characteristics of what is being exchanged and 
the cost of enforcing agreements. However, Cheung (1998) argued that transaction costs 
must be defined to be all the costs which do not exist in a Robinson Crusoe economy 
and should actually be called “institution cost”.
Risk is the effect of uncertainty on objectives. Many risks arise because of transaction 
costs (of information or enforcing contracts). Nonetheless, some risks exist even without 
any institutional costs. Time is the specified deadline before which a contracted task 
must be performed. Neo-classical theories have assumed all transactions are instantane-
ous. However, in the engineering field, usually time is of essence. 
2.3. NIE theory of project management
To summarize, we opine that project management is a discipline that encompasses 
both operational management and economics. On the one hand, project management 
involves optimization of project processes. This falls into the discipline of operational 
management. On the other hand, the complex processes involve human behaviours that 
fall into the discipline of economics. The NIE framework has a basic postulation that 
human beings will maximize their benefits under constraints. These constraints can be 
broadly divided into ten categories. When the constraints change, human behaviours 
will change which will be observable. In other words, our theoretical framework can 
generate empirically testable hypotheses, thereby fulfilling the requirements of being a 
theory. We shall demonstrate this by using three examples in the later sections. 
Basically, a lot of constraints could be converted into the constraints of cost, then the 
law of demand could be applied. The difficulty of this theoretical framework lies in the 
clear understanding of the constraints, as constraints are real world phenomena which 
should not and cannot be imagined. For now let us have a deeper understanding of this 
theoretical framework by a discussion on the functions of project management. 
3. Functions and constraints of project management
In this section, we shall discuss the functions of project management in the context 
of our new NIE framework. It has been found that in project management the most 
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frequently addressed industry was construction (Betts, Lansley 1995; Pinto, Slevin 
1988; Themistocleous, Wearne 2000). As a result, we shall use construction project 
management as an example, although the theory is intended to be general. 
3.1. Functions of project management
The project life cycle usually consists of the following stages: conceptualization, plan-
ning, execution and termination. In the conceptualization stage, alternatives and their 
feasibilities are studied and finally desirable outcomes and possible outputs are identi-
fied. In the planning stage, the concepts in the previous stage is refined, and the means 
of achieving them is defined. In the execution stage, the outputs are processed. In the 
termination stage, the outputs are commissioned and delivered to the client. The func-
tion of project management is to optimize the whole process. We shall discuss in more 
detail below.
The Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) suggests nine knowledge are-
as, namely, project integration management, scope management, time management, cost 
management, quality management, human resource management, communication man-
agement, risk management and procurement management (PMI 2000). The functions of 
project management are to make sure all these nine areas of management are properly 
done. The first area, namely, project integration management, is simply making sure 
all other processes are properly done. Other areas, however, need detailed discussion. 
Scope management & quality management. The project is usually divided into phases 
such as design, tender and construction. Each phase could be regarded as a “subproject”. 
Scope Management and Quality Management are “outsourced” by contract to the “man-
ager” of each phase. The project manager makes sure scope & quality is managed in 
each phase. He needs to make sure the following 3 matters: 
a. An architect will manage the scope and quality in the design stage, and 
b. The requirements on scope and quality is properly documented in the tender stage, 
and 
c. A construction manager from the contractor will manage the scope and quality in 
the construction stage, and an architect or a contract administrator will check the 
compliance of scope and quality.
Time management. The project is divided into phases such as design, tender and con-
struction. The client contracts with an architect, a quantity surveyor (QS) and a contrac-
tor in each phase. Time will be a condition in each contract so that if the other party is 
late in delivering the required output, he has to pay damages to the client. Therefore, 
the requirements on time are usually converted into costs.
Cost management. The project is divided into phases such as design, tender and con-
struction. A major part of cost management work is “outsourced” by contract to a QS. 
The project manager needs to make sure the following tasks will run smoothly: 
a. In the conceptualization stage, the QS will establish a budget and agree it with 
the client. 
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b. In the design stage, the QS will prepare cost plans to make sure the design is 
within budget, the architect needs to amend the design if cost is over the budget. 
This process may repeat a few times.
c. In the tender stage, the QS will recommend a procurement strategy including the 
selection of contracts, e.g., the use of a lump sum contract, so that cost can be 
controlled.
d. A contract manager from the contractor will manage the cost of the contractor so 
that they will not make a loss.
Human resource management. Project staffs are either within or without the same firm 
of the project manager. If the staffs are within the same firm, the project manager may 
not have the authority to terminate the employment contract. In this case, other manage-
ment skills such as leadership are relevant.
If they are outside the firm, their services must be purchased through contracts. The 
project manager needs to ensure their performance can be properly measured and ideally 
be linked to the payment. According to Steven Cheung (2002b), the monitoring costs 
(one type of transaction costs) will be lower if the aspect of performance is measured 
and priced. Therefore, when an architect is contracted for provision of design, the moni-
toring cost will be lower in the case that we only pay upon completion of the design 
to a certain detail, than in the case that we pay him according to the time he spends.
Communications management. Communication management in projects is done explic-
itly and implicitly. On the one hand, there are formal and informal meetings and written 
communications such drawings, instructions, etc. On the other hand, institutions are 
formed to act as coordination mechanisms (Kadefors 1995). These institutions include 
well-known procurement methods, e.g. traditional lump sum method, re-measurement 
method, etc.; tendering system; standardizations of, e.g., work processes, output, skills 
and knowledge, contract forms, etc. As Kadefors (1995) pointed out, the need for com-
munication is reduced if the tasks and roles are standardized, as the participants then 
know what behaviour to expect from those performing independent tasks. 
Therefore, the role of project manager in communication management is twofold. First, 
he must plan and coordinate regular meeting and the timely distribution of written docu-
ments. Second, he must make use of the institutions formed in the industry, as it is very 
difficult to change institutions once they are formed.
Risk management. Risk is an uncertain event or condition, that if it occurs, has a posi-
tive or negative effect on a project objective (PMI 2000). Risk management involves 
identification, quantification and ranking, responses strategies and monitoring and con-
trolling. Risks are either avoided, or transferred, or mitigated or accepted. These involve 
change of plan, use of contracts such as insurance or lump sum contracts, etc. The role 
of project manager is to make sure this process is conducted properly.
Procurement management. This includes the procurement of both services and materi-
als. In both cases contracts are involved. Procurement of materials is easier, while the 
contracts for services are more complicated as it involves the definition, measurement, 
monitoring and pricing of services. The same theory applies here: the monitoring costs 
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will be lower if the aspect of performance is measured and priced (Cheung 2002b). In 
construction, a quantity surveyor will usually provide advice on procurement.
Having discussed the functions of project management, we now turn to the analysis of 
constraints faced in the parties involved. After all, the analysis of constraints is the most 
difficult part in the application of this theory. 
3.2. Constraints
We shall discuss the constraints in details and show that constraints are often related and 
that in many cases other constraints can finally be converted into the constraint of cost.
Price is obviously a constraint. The law of demand is simply the most useful theory in 
microeconomics. Cost is obviously another constraint. For instance, if the client does not 
specify the materials for the walls which could be made of either brick or timber, and if 
timber is cheaper, the contractor will choose to use timber to build the walls. Constraints 
discussed below could actually be converted into the constraint of cost in many cases.
Wealth is a constraint. Large contractors usually own more plant and machinery. Smaller 
one, constrained by wealth, may need to hire plant and machinery. Where they are not 
available for hire, they may need to substitute them with labours, which might cost 
more. Hence, the constraint of wealth might be converted into that of cost.
Knowledge is a constraint. If depth of foundation is estimated wrongly because of lack 
of knowledge, it may end up with a collapsed building which will be costly. In addi-
tion, freshmen in a trade may need a lot of training to gain the necessary skills. If they 
are required nevertheless in case of shortage of labour, higher training costs and lower 
productivity will happen, and these increase the cost.
A producer will face the constraint of the law of diminishing marginal productivity. For 
instance, a contractor needs to speed up the construction for whatever reasons. Suppose 
both plant and labours are required to do the job, e.g., excavation of trenches for the 
foundation. If for some reasons one of the factors of production cannot be increased, 
e.g. the maximum number of plant (excavator) is two due to the limitation of space, 
increasing the other factor of production, i.e., labour, will increase the total product, 
but at a decreasing rate, till a point when the total product reaches maximum and then 
goes down. The implication of this constraint is actually on costs as lower productivity 
means higher costs.
Competition is a constraint. When we make contracts, we would not worry about ex-
tremely high prices as we know there are competitions from a lot of potential suppliers.
Specialization and exchange dramatically improve productivity. This wisdom was 
established by Adam Smith (he called it division of labour). While classical econo-
mists David Ricardo and John Mill opined that comparative advantage is the reason 
for specialization, Steven Cheung (1998) argued that in addition to that, accumulation 
of knowledge is more important. Therefore, we see people specialize in one trade or 
another. In construction, workers also specialize. Therefore we will need a team of 
tradesmen including, e.g., concreter, brick layer, roofer, glazier, plumber, electrician, etc. 
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When we want to ask these tradesmen to work for us, we contract with them. This 
inevitably involves the property rights system, e.g. are we free to contract with them? 
In communist China, resource allocation and income distribution were all performed 
by the government. A contractor, who was necessarily the most efficient one, would be 
designated by government officers (this seldom happens today). If that is the case, the 
rules of competition will be different from price mechanism with which economists are 
familiar. It will be difficult to negotiate and enforce any requirements of the project, i.e. 
transaction costs in this system are much higher.
Property rights include the rules of law, customs, etc. Therefore, when a law changes the 
rule of completion, we shall observe changes in behaviours (see examples in next section).
Now suppose we have private property rights system that is common in most developed 
countries. Transaction costs arise when we contract. We choose to contract because the 
benefits from specialization and exchange are greater than the transaction costs. Under 
the postulation of constrained maximization, people will minimize the transaction costs 
to gain the benefits of specialization and exchange. This explains the popular use of 
standard forms of contracts in construction industry.
Risk is a constraint. We can avoid, mitigate, transfer or accept the risks. When we avoid 
or mitigate risks, we change our behaviours which will be observable and may have im-
pacts on costs. When we transfer the risks, by e.g. insurance or by contracts, the parties 
now bearing the risks will charge a premium which acts to our costs. However, because 
of competition, they can only charge at a market rate. When the risk is too trivial, we 
accept it and do nothing.
Time is a constraint. A construction contract usually specify the period within which the 
works must be completed. If a contractor fails to complete before the specified completion 
date, he needs to pay a “liquidated damage” to the client which is a genuine pre-estimate 
of the likely loss suffered by the client. In this way, time constraint is converted to cost.
The constraints of property rights and transaction costs are the two most difficult con-
straints for analysis as it requires deep understanding of the subject matter. We shall 
therefore demonstrate how changes in these two constraints could lead to changes in 
behaviours in the next section. 
4. Some applications
We could derive refutable hypothesis when the constraints change. We shall convert the 
constraints into the constraint of cost and then apply the law of demand to make testable 
hypothesis. Below are three examples.
H1:  If the law puts the burden of construction safety on the contractor such that the 
contractor needs to compensate when a worker dies, the safety performance of 
contractor will improve. 
This hypothesis deals with the changes in the constraint of property rights (the laws). 
As the law puts the burden on the contractor, the price for the contractor to provide a 
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safe working environment becomes lower, because the price now equal to the cost of 
providing a safe working environment minus the expected savings on compensations to 
the workers. According to the Law of Demand, as the price goes down, the contractor 
will tend to provide a safer working environment and therefore the safety performance 
will be improved. The empirical evidence was documented in Yung (2009), although 
how the changes in constraints lead to observable behavioral change was not made 
clear in that paper. 
H2:  If the law mandates that construction quality shall be supervised by independent 
construction supervisors, the quality performance of contractor will improve. 
This hypothesis again deals with the changes in the constraint of property right (the 
laws). As the construction quality is now supervised by an independent construction 
supervisor, any work with poor quality might have to be demolished and reconstructed. 
Therefore, the price of providing good quality work becomes lower, as the price is now 
equal to the cost of providing good quality work minus the expected savings in the 
possible demolition and rework. According to the Law of Demand, as the price goes 
down, the contractor will tend to provide better quality works and therefore the qual-
ity performance will be improved. The empirical evidence was documented in Yung 
and Lai (2008), although how the changes in constraints lead to observable behavioral 
change was not made clear in that paper. 
H3:  construction works procured with “cost plus percentage or fixed fee” method will be 
more expensive than those procured with lump sum method, other things being equal. 
This case deals with the transaction cost of monitoring efficiency. According to Cheung 
(2002b), the monitoring costs (one type of transaction costs) will be lower if the as-
pect of performance is measured and priced, because measurement itself constitutes 
monitoring. There are several established procurement methods for construction works, 
e.g., lump sum based on bills of quantities, cost plus etc. In a building contract, what 
the client wants to buy from the contractor is the materials, labours, plant use and the 
efficiency of performance. In a lump sum contract, all these aspects are measured and 
priced. The most efficient contractor will be chosen because he can offer the lowest 
price, and he has to work efficiently as he also faces the constraint of cost. However, 
in a cost plus contract, all the costs of the contractor, including materials, labours, and 
plant use, will be paid plus a fee to cover the contractor’s overhead and profit. This 
method, however, failed to consider the efficiency of the contractor. Therefore, it will 
be more costly to monitor the efficiency of the contractor, and the latter tends to work 
less efficiently. Indeed, in the arrangements of cost plus percentage fee and cost plus 
fixed fee, the more inefficient the contractor is, the more he gets paid.
5. A synthesis with existing theories
We opine that project management has both the component of operational management 
and the component of economics. Therefore, our theory encompasses both the Task Per-
spective and the Organizational Perspective of project management. On the one hand, 
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projects are practice which needs to be conceptualized, planned and executed. There-
fore, it has an engineering component. On the other hands, projects must be performed 
by humans, the behaviours of which fall into the discipline of economics. 
The study of project success factors and criteria has been very popular in the litera-
ture of project management. Indeed, it was classified as a school of thought (Bredillet 
2008a). However, it has been found that the lists of success or failure factors vary in 
various studies (Belassi, Tukel 1996). It is also found that critical success factors (CSFs) 
differ in different project stages (Pinto, Slevin 1988) and as project objectives change 
(Chua et al. 1999). Therefore, the CSFs identified in one project may not be applicable 
to other projects. These findings are in some way consistent with the research on project 
typology which advocates that different types of projects need different management 
approaches.
Our interpretation of the above findings is that the constraints are different in different 
projects, and therefore people will have different behaviours under different constraints. 
Therefore, our theory is also consistent with the “success school” of research and the 
project typology research. Further researches could be directed to interpretation of the 
success criteria found in the literature with our theory. 
Application of our theory is, however, not easy. It requires the researcher to investigate 
the actual constraints faced in the project, especially the constraints of property rights 
and transaction costs. Our emphasis is that theories must be refutable. Constraints are 
real world matters, one should not simply think of a few constraints in the office and 
avoid the challenge of empirical testing. Therefore, the application of this theory re-
quires deeper understanding of project actuality. Hence, our theory is in some way 
consistent with the “project-as-practice” approach (Blomquist et al. 2010; Cicmil et al. 
2006), although our theory has a thorough theoretical background. 
Conclusions
This paper has developed a New Institutional Economic Theory of project manage-
ment. The motivation has been the confusing opinions on the theories of project man-
agement. We suggested that project management is a discipline that encompasses both 
operational management and economics. On the one hand, project management is 
a professional practice that seeks to optimize the processes of project. This part is 
consistent with the traditional Task Perspective of project management. On the other 
hand, project management deals with human behaviours which fall into the discipline 
of economics. This part is consistent with the Organizational Perspective of project 
management.
In summary, we have developed a theoretical framework capable of developing refuta-
ble hypotheses to study project management. We have demonstrated how functions of 
project management are performed with the example of construction project manage-
ment, although our theory is intended to be generally applicable. We have shown how 
scope, cost, time, quality, human resources, information, procurement, and risks are 
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managed in construction project management. We have also shown a few examples 
how refutable hypotheses could be derived from our theoretical framework. Essentially, 
when the constraints change, we will observe changes in behaviours. We have shown 
that changes in constraints in many cases could be converted into changes in costs, 
thereby enabling the application of the law of demand. Therefore, our theory is empiri-
cally testable. We have also given a synthesis with existing theories. 
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